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A neglected strategy of the Aristotelian Alexander on Necessity and 
Responsibility * 
 
A justly influential author, Michael Frede, has treated as an orthodoxy, 
needing no discussion, what had earlier been put forward as an 
interpretation of Alexander, and put forward in an objective spirit, in a 
seminal article by Susanne Bobzien, an article which I have reprinted in 
Aristotle Re-interpreted.1 She discussed the Stoics’ opponent, Alexander 
of Aphrodisias, who held the Aristotelian chair in Athens five hundred 
years after Aristotle’s death, at or soon after 200 AD. He was the greatest 
defender of Aristotelianism, and at a time when Aristotelianism needed 
defending against the refurbished versions of Stoicism and Platonism. 
Her interpretation of Alexander on this subject has now been treated not 
only as an orthodoxy, but as a ground for a sustained onslaught on 
Alexander as caught in a hopeless tangle, which will, I am afraid, mislead 
some readers, if nothing is said on the other side. I will draw attention to 
two small passages of Alexander, mentioned but not discussed in 
Bobzien’s enlightening treatment, which I think may suggest that he had 
an entirely different strategy. I also disagree with the other objections 
raised against Alexander, and will try to fill out the picture of his 
approach, as I see it. But first I should give the context of Bobzien’s 
interpretation; I will come to what I think is a mistaken use of her 
interpretation later.  
In her article, Bobzien homes in on Alexander being the first to deny a 
certain Stoic principle. The principle is that if in the same circumstances 
(periestêkota), as Alexander puts it in his On Fate – or external 
circumstances, as it is more misleadingly put by him or someone else in 
                                                        
* I am glad to dedicate what follows to M.M.McCabe, whose seminars, single or 
joint, have inspired many generations of students and colleagues, and were 
sometimes billed as being about ‘old chestnuts’. For the present book in her 
honour, chapters have been invited on ‘old chestnuts’ or ‘sacred cows’. I have no 
sacred cow in view, but something of similar importance: an influential 
treatment of one interpretation of Alexander as if it were an orthodoxy not 
requiring discussion and as seriously discrediting Alexander. I thank Verity 
Harte for helping me to tighten up my argument. 
1 Susanne Bobzien, ‘The inadvertent conception and late birth of the free will 
problem’, Phronesis 43, 1998, pp. 133-175, reprinted in Richard Sorabji, ed., 
Aristotle Re-interpreted, New Findings on Seven Hundred Years of the Ancient 
Commentators, Bloomsbury, London 2016, Ch. 3. 
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Mantissa (Supplement to On the Soul)2 – one acted (or chose, as the 
Mantissa adds) now in one way, now in another, there would be a change 
without any cause, which is impossible.3 The Mantissa’s confinement to 
external circumstances is misleading because the Stoics think one’s 
internal psychological state is also relevant to whether one can act 
otherwise. Bobzien finds no precedent for Alexander’s denial of the Stoic 
principle that one will act the same way in the same circumstances, even 
among Middle Platonist discussions of Aristotle’s undetermined sea 
battle in his On Interpretation 9. In her definitive book of the same year, 
Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy, she throws new light 
again by pointing out that the name of the 2nd century CE Stoic who 
pressed this question, Philopator, is given in the late fourth century report 
of the Christian Nemesius, Bishop of Emesa. It was Philopator’s earlier 
question to which Alexander felt obliged to reply. Nemesius records 
Philopator’s argument a third way by saying that with the same causes as 
circumstances (aitiôn periestêkotôn), it is not possible that the same 
things happen now one way, now otherwise.4 I think that Philopator’s 
challenge made Alexander make up his mind how far in advance 
necessitation would be objectionable. At one point, Alexander tellingly 
objects to our doing or not doing something having been inevitable before 
we were born.5 Many people, but not all, would indeed see inevitability 
before birth, like Alexander, as particularly threatening to the idea of our 
moral responsibility, that is, to the idea that we can be justifiably praised 
or blamed for what we do. Aristotle had been vaguer in the discussion of 
his sea battle.6 Various ethical ideas other than responsibility would be 
jeopardised, he thought, if our acts had been inevitable ten thousand years 
ago, or for the whole of time. But under pressure from Philopator’s 
question, Alexander goes further. Even in the extreme case, where the 
same external and internal circumstances have recurred, it still need not 
be inevitable beforehand how we will act. 
The denial of Philopator’s principle is one new step by Alexander, but 
Bobzien rightly argues that he does not take the further step of 
introducing the idea of will as being free. In another innovation of her 
book, she finds the first move of this type in the Christian tradition 
marginally earlier in the Christian Justin Martyr (died c. 165). 
                                                        
2 Not all passages in the Mantissa are necessarily by Alexander, so I will rely on 
his On Fate, but most of the Mantissa passages I cite are in agreement with On 
Fate. 
3 Alexander On Fate, Ch. 15, 185,7-11; Mantissa (Supplement to On the Soul) § 23, 
174,3-7. The authenticity of this part of the Mantissa has not been challenged. 
4 Nemesius On the Nature of Man pp. 174, 3-27, Morani. 
5 Alexander On Fate Ch. 17, 188, 15. 
6 Aristotle On Interpretation, Ch. 9. 
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Alexander’s neglected strategy, On Fate Ch. 15 and Mantissa § 23 
Now I will turn to the two small passages of Alexander (if the second is 
also by him) which I believe may show that he had a different and 
neglected strategy: On Fate Chapter 15 and Mantissa (Supplement to On 
the Soul) § 23.  
 
For indeed if our decision (krisis) about things to be done took place with a view to 
one goal (skopos), perhaps there would be some reason to hold that our decisions 
about the same things would always turn out similar. But since that is not so (for we 
choose (haireisthai) what we chose sometimes on account of the noble, sometimes 
on account of the pleasant and sometimes on account of the advantageous, and it is 
not the same things that produce these outcomes), it is possible for us now to be 
moved towards the noble <and choose> these things at hand in our surroundings and 
at another time [to choose] others, according as we make our judgement in reference 
to the pleasant or the advantageous.7 
 
For if one had one goal in relation to which one made one’s decision refer, it would 
have been reasonable that one should always choose the same thing from among the 
same things, at least if one always had and preserved the same stance in relation to 
the goal set before one and looked to it in making one’s decision between things. 
But since there are several ends to which one looks in making one’s decision and 
choice of things to be done (for one has before one’s eyes the pleasant, the 
advantageous and the noble, and not all the things surrounding one have the same 
relation to each of these), one makes one’s judgement about he things and one’s 
choice among them sometimes in relation to the pleasant, sometimes in relation to 
the noble and at other times in relation to the advantageous, and will not always do 
the same things, nor always choose the same things, even when all the surrounding 
circumstances are the same. But each time [will do or choose] the things which most 
appear to lead to the goal.8   
 
I believe that Alexander is here drawing a distinction, which I once9 
ascribed to Aristotle and defended as a good one, between being caused 
and being necessitated. Being caused, for Aristotle, is having a certain 
kind of explanatory factor. In the passages ascribed to his follower 
Alexander, our choice or action has a perfectly good cause (explanatory 
factor) in one of the three standing motives cited. But which of our 
standing motives will operate is not necessitated. Alexander wants 
thereby to show that even when necessity is absent, a cause can be 
present, contrary to Philopator’s charge from the beginning of each 
chapter, that the absence of necessity would imply a causeless change. 
                                                        
7 Alexander On Fate Ch. 15, 185, 21-28. < > represents the conjectural filling of a 
suspected gap in the Greek; [ ] an explanatory addition to the English. 
8 Alexander ?Mantissa § 23, 174,13-24. 
9 Richard Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame, Duckworth, London 1980, Chicago 
University Press 2006, Ch. 2 
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There are several advantages of this interpretation of the two passages. 
First, instead of the passages playing no obvious role, they will provide a 
relevant defence against the point of immediate concern, Philopator’s 
charge that Alexander’s denial of the need for necessity before the  
moment of choice or decision saddles him with changes occurring 
without a cause. Further, we shall see that this interpretation will defend 
Alexander also from the charges of a modern interpreter, that Alexander 
has got himself into a hopeless tangle. The advantages of the 
interpretation, then, are that Alexander’s passages thus come out neither 
irrelevant, nor confused. If that makes the interpretation of Alexander 
plausible, then it may add a certain amount of support also for my earlier 
identification of the same distinction between cause and necessity in the 
founding father of Alexander’s school, Aristotle. 
In the two chapters, Alexander first argues that the person is the cause, 
and, in more detail, that the person’s deliberation (boulê), deliberate 
choice (prohairesis) and judgement (krisis) are the cause.10 That much is 
intended to establish his first point, that there is a cause. To me his most 
interesting argument for the second point, that there need be no necessity, 
is his observation that we have more than one motive, and he names the 
noble, the pleasant and the advantageous.11 Indeed, we do have different 
standing motives, and the adherents of Philopator, who introduced the 
theme of necessity at the beginning of each chapter, would need to show 
that necessity has to govern which standing motive takes effect. I myself 
think that that cannot be shown and that Alexander is safe. But it is not 
whether he is safe that matters for present purposes, but that this is the 
strategy Alexander intends. He needs such a strategy, if he is to answer 
Philopator’s actual objection, that he has created a change without a 
cause. The most relevant change is the person’s action. Alexander’s 
strategy says that whichever standing motive operates provides a 
perfectly good cause of that action. Alexander does not have to worry that 
from his perspective there is something else that may have no 
explanation, let alone a necessitating explanation, although that is not 
necessarily because the motives are incommensurable. There may be no 
explanation of why this time one standing motive operated, last time 
another. The objection that this would divorce the agent from his wants or 
beliefs, or from his character, disposition, or reason does not seem to me 
convincing. The agent may by character always be equally attracted to 
two or more incentives, or may be volatile in susceptibilities. It is up to 
the Stoics to show that there must be an explanation, and a determining 
one, of the agent’s variability, and this may be difficult. The important 
                                                        
10 Alexander On Fate Ch. 15, 185, 15-16; Mantissa § 23, 174,9-10. 
11 Alexander On Fate Ch. 15, 185, 21-28; Mantissa § 23, 174,13-24. 
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point is that the objection Philopator did offer has been answered: the 
cause of the action which he desiderates is the operative motive.   
Frede takes Alexander’s ability to choose otherwise in the same 
circumstances as coming close to the belief of his predecessor as Sather 
lecturer, Albrecht Dihle, in a will that decides or chooses in a way that is 
independent of the desires and beliefs of the person. Tony Long as editor 
has found a passage of Dihle’s published Sather lectures in which Dihle 
says something like that in his own person.12 But the wording applied by 
Frede to Alexander is very close to that of Susanne Bobzien’s article, 
when she introduces the view that I can decide between alternative 
courses of action independently of certain internal factors, e.g. my 
desires, and goes on to apply this to Alexander.13 
Alexander has another related but different strategy that Bobzien 
mentions. In his On Fate version, the wise person does not do what they 
choose by being necessitated (katênankasmenôs), For it might at some 
time seem reasonable (eulogon) to a wise person to refute a prediction of 
their activity and show the activity’s freedom (eleutheron), in 
Alexander’s carefully explicated sense, by not doing at some time what 
would [otherwise] have been brought about by that wise person as [also] 
reasonable (eulogôs). In the Mantissa version, even if a person chose the 
same things in the same circumstances, thinking them to be more 
reasonable, it would not follow that the choosing was necessitated 
(katênankasmenôs), nor that external factors were causes of the decisions 
[sc. which would make the choice forced, biaion]. For the power is 
available (exesti) to that person, if they want to show at some time that 
that their choice is not necessitated (katênankasmenên) and want to defeat 
the prediction, also to chose what they did not [otherwise] think 
reasonable. Once again, what is being denied here is necessitation, not 
causation. Their choice depends in either case on what they think 
reasonable and in one case partly on competitiveness of character, which 
is explicitly mentioned. Their normal desires are operating, and the 
desires correspond to their characters as wise or competitive. A further 
case is mentioned in On Fate to show that physiognomic predictions 
cannot help getting it wrong. This is the case in which Socrates says that, 
by the discipline of philosophy, he overcame his original nature (phusis), 
                                                        
12 Albrecht Dihle, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity, University of 
California, Berkeley 1982, p. 135. 
13 This is mentioned only as a consequence of Alexander’s view in Bobzien’ 
article at pp. 134-5, 139, 171 (pp. 126, 130, 156 in Aristotle Re-interpreted. In the 
last two passages she adds independence of the agent’s disposition, character 
reason or nature, which is not a cause). But it is repeated as a criticism of 
Alexander in Michael Frede, A Free Will, University of California Press, Berkeley, 
CA, 2011, p. 98. 
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which would have made him a womaniser.14 In none of the cases of the 
ability to refute predictions is the suggestion that wants and beliefs in line 
with present character do not act as causes. The point is the entirely 
different one that the actions are not necessitated and in the Mantissa are 
also not forced by external factors. In the case of Socrates, what was 
overridden was only his original nature and potential character, not his 
acquired character, which Aristotle would call his second nature. In the 
other cases, character need not have been overridden at all, any more than 
desires and beliefs. 
I now come to Frede’s interpretation of Alexander of Aphrodisias and 
attack based on that interpretation. Frede’s attack was delivered in his 
celebrated Sather lectures, beautifully edited from an unfinished 
manuscript after his untimely death by Tony Long.15 It concerned 
Alexander’s views on moral responsibility, or liability to praise and 
blame, and the type of freedom which he took that to require. I shall 
attempt to make a case on the other side by first trying to explain more 
fully what Alexander was doing. I shall say that that included some 
positive and unexpected turns, and that he is not guilty of the errors with 
which he is charged. 
 
Up to us versus freedom 
Alexander was interested in necessity and causation not only for its own 
sake, but because of its implications for whether necessity would allow 
our actions or choices to be up to us, in other words, liable to justified 
praise or blame.  Many people may think that Alexander’s claim is 
implausible when he says that necessity must be avoided right up the 
moment of action or choice, if our actions or choices are to be up to us. 
But opinions may be more evenly divided on his view that our behaviour 
could not be up to us, and hence that we could not be liable to justified 
praise or blame for it, if that behaviour had been necessary or inevitable 
before we were born.16 Inevitability before birth is indeed a more obvious 
source of worry for those who feel responsibility threatened, than 
inevitability a fraction before the moment of action, which is what 
Alexander resists.  
There should be no such dispute about whether behaviour inevitable 
from before birth could be free, to which I shall come, because on the 
Stoic Epictetus’ conception of freedom as invulnerability, it clearly could 
be, while on Alexander’s conception of freedom as unnecessitated choice 
or action, it clearly could not. But whether behaviour inevitable from 
                                                        
14 Cicero On Fate 5.10; cf. Tusculan Disputations 4.80 
15 Michael Frede, A Free Will, pp.95-101. The book represents his celebrated Sather 
lectures, beautifully edited by A.A.Long. 
16 Alexander On Fate Ch. 17, 188, 15 
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before birth could be up to us and hence whether we could be liable to 
justified praise or blame, is a question on which then as now there seems 
to be no agreement. No clinching argument has been found, and people 
continue to appeal to different intuitions. In these circumstances, people 
may feel exasperated and think that their opponents’ arguments beg the 
question. It is interesting that Alexander himself makes such a charge in 
Chapter 34 of his On Fate. He complains that his Stoic opponents claim 
that necessity all along is compatible with things being up to us, on the 
ground that it is compatible with our having virtue or vice. But that begs 
the question, he says, because as one who denies that up to us is 
compatible, he also denies that virtue and vice are compatible with all 
along necessity. However, I think we do better to avoid exasperation, 
since it is felt by both sides. 
Although Philopator was challenging Alexander to accept only necessity 
fractionally before the action, the Stoics themselves accepted all along 
necessity, despite some attempts by the third head, Chrysippus, to find 
special senses of necessity in which it was not required. I have considered 
these attempts elsewhere, but I did not think they removed the necessity 
that worried the indeterminist,17 and I am not aware of Epictetus or other 
later Stoics relying on them. Let us now look at the definition by the 
Stoics and by Alexander first of up to us and then of freedom. 
 
Alexander’s partial acceptance of a new Stoic definition of up to us, 
On Fate, Chs 13-14 
Bobzien’s discussion of Philopator points out that Alexander’s On Fate 
Ch. 13 reports, and Ch. 14 repeats, a new Stoic definition of up to us 
(eph’ hêmin) which seems also to be the work of Philopator, since the 
phrasing is repeated by Nemesius in the passage which discusses him.18 
What is up to us (humans) comes about not merely through us, as earlier 
Stoics had said, but in this refined definition through our being impelled 
(hormê) and giving our assent (sunkatathesis). What is up to the 
irrational animals, however, comes about through their being impelled in 
a sense, but not through their assent, since assent is given by reason and 
they lack reason. At most they should be said to yield (eikein) rather than 
assenting and to engage in behaviour (energein), rather than acting 
(prattein). So we may guess that ‘up to an animal’, unlike ‘up to us’, does 
not for these Stoics imply moral responsibility. As for a stone or fire, 
                                                        
17 Richard Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame, Duckworth, London 1980, Chicago 
University Press 2006, Bloomsbury 2013, Ch. 4. 
18 Alexander On Fate Ch. 13, 182, 16-19; Ch. 14, 183,22-3; 184,12-13; Nemesius 
On the Nature of Man 105, 9-12, Morani. 
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certain things come about through these, such as falling, or heating, but 
these activities are not described as up to the stone or fire.  
It is striking and somewhat surprising that in Ch. 14, Alexander accepts 
much of this new Stoic definition of up to, which will lead him to further 
divergences from Aristotle. But he does add two points of his own.19 The 
Stoic view was that assent and yielding are given to a motivating 
appearance (hormêtikê phantasia) about what to do. Alexander picks up 
both the Stoic appeal to appearance and their belief that assent is given by 
reason. A human has reason, he says, as a judge (kritês) of appearances 
about things to be done (phantasiai peri tôn prakteôn), and uses it to 
examine (exetazein) whether the appearance is really the case. If not (and 
this is Alexander’s major point), a human does not concede (sunkhôrein) 
to it, but resists (enhistasthai). In this way a human can abstain from, or 
pass by, what appears to be pleasant or advantageous. Endorsing the 
Stoic term ‘assent’ and the Stoic belief that it is rational, he adds his own 
term ‘deliberation’, but not in the context in which it was most used by 
Aristotle (deliberation about policies for achieving what matters in life). 
The only deliberation he mentions is about the reliability of appearances 
in a particular situation (a typical Stoic concern), and what to do if reality 
is different. The very essence of a human as a rational being is to have 
within himself (or herself) the original source (arkhê) of choosing 
(helesthai) or not choosing, so that someone who abolishes that, 
abolishes the human being. Alexander’s strategy is to accept the Stoic 
requirement of rational assent to (some) appearances, and further to insist 
on something else with which the Stoics would agree, that we can 
examine and reject appearances. But he then concludes that we can 
abstain, pass by and choose or not. It is presumably at that point, 
although he does not say so, that he thinks that Stoic ‘all along’ necessity 
has all along closed off any alternative outcome.  
Alexander’s other objection in Ch. 14 starts with a small oversight 
pointed out by Bobzien. He wrongly thinks the Stoics allow ‘up to us’ to 
irrational animals, whereas in fact what the Stoics allow them is 
described as ‘up to animals’.20 But Alexander would object to this too 
because he wants to deny that anything is up to animals. This denial is 
forced on him by his strategy of accepting the new Stoic definition of up 
to us in terms of occurring through the assent of reason, since most 
Aristotelians agree with Stoics that animals lack reason.21 Alexander 
confronts Stoic views either by rejecting them, or by accepting them as 
                                                        
19 Alexander On Fate Ch. 14, 183, 21- 184, 20. 
20 Alexander On Fate Ch. 14, 183, 23-4. 
21 Aristotle’s pupil Theophrastus is an exception according to Porphyry On 
Abstinence Book 3.25.3.  
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causing no threat to Aristotelianism. But in the present case, I believe his 
acceptance causes him to diverge from Aristotle. 
How does Alexander diverge? He recognises a chapter in which 
Aristotle explicitly allows that animal behaviour can be voluntary.22 Since 
Aristotle introduced the subject of voluntariness in the same chapter by 
saying that the voluntary is subject to praise and blame,23 this is a strong 
indication that animals can be praised and blamed, as I have argued 
elsewhere is true of higher domesticated animals.24As for Alexander, he 
appears to allow that irrational animals do not merely ‘yield’, but some 
can give assent of a sort,25 but evidently not the assent of reason. 
However, Alexander distinguishes up to us from the voluntary more 
explicitly than Aristotle and he denies that anything can be up to 
irrational animals, because of his acceptance that up to us involves assent 
in accordance with reason and judgement, which irrational animals lack.26 
Alexander understood this reason and judgement as involving 
deliberation, and Aristotle himself had denied that animals can make a 
deliberate choice of policy (prohairesis), something he treats as based on 
deliberation. Some modern scholars, at least one on the authority of 
Alexander, have argued that Aristotle intends up to us to require either 
deliberate choice, or the capacity for deliberate choice.27  My reason for 
doubting this is that two texts from Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics and from 
the books common to the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics make 
voluntariness imply up to us, while three texts from Nicomachean Ethics 
3.1 and 3.5 create this implication indirectly as following from the 
voluntary having an internal origin of action, and an internal origin of 
action implying up to us.28 In other words, I take Aristotle to allow that 
behaviour that is voluntary is thereby up to the agent. In that case, 
                                                        
22 Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1111b8-9. 
23 Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1109b31. 
24 For what follows, see Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals, 
Duckworth London and Cornell University Press 1993, Bloomsbury, London 
2013, pp. 108-112. 
25 Alexander On Fate Ch 14, 183,31. 
26 Alexander On Fate Ch. 14, 183,26-9. 
27 Terry Irwin, ‘Reason and responsibility in Aristotle’, in A.Rorty, ed., Essays on 
Aristotle’s Ethics, California University Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1980, pp. 
117-55; Walter G. Englert, ‘Epicurus on the swerve and voluntary action, Atlanta, 
Georgia, 1987, Ch. 5; Roderick Long’s, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias and Aristotle on 
the conditions for moral responsibility’ was based on his PhD dissertation, Free 
choice and indeterminism in Aristotle and later antiquity, Cornell University 1992. 
 
28 Aristotle Eudemian Ethics 2.9, 1225b8; Nicomachean Ethics 5.8, 1135a24; 3.1, 
1110a15-18; 3.5, 1113b19-23; 1114a18-19. 
 
  
10 
Alexander’s acceptance of the Stoic idea that what is up to us involves 
the assent of reason, coupled with his assumption that they do not 
distinguish between up to us and up to irrational animals, lead him to 
diverge from Aristotle in denying that anything is up to irrational 
animals.29  
 
Alexander on freedom, On Fate Chs. 18-19 
I must now turn to the invocation of freedom, because in On Fate Ch. 
18, Alexander himself invokes freedom in making a criticism of the 
Stoics, which may indeed seem to open him to objections. He has just 
been talking in Ch. 17 of the Stoics as believing that it has been 
necessitated since before our birth what we will do or not do. Yet, so he 
complains in Ch. 18, in all they say, the Stoics behave as if they had 
never heard of that doctrine, by hanging on to what is free (eleutheron), 
to which he adds as if it were his gloss ‘and under our own control 
(autexousion)’, and he goes on to mention the need for alternative 
possibilities of acting or not acting, when he uses the phrase ‘or not’.30 
The Stoics behave as if they were free in this sense, he complains, when 
they try to persuade others to a different course, as if they themselves had 
the power (exousia) to do this or not, and as if the others were able to 
choose (haireisthai). They also reproach and rebuke people, and again 
they act as if it were up to them (ep’ autois) to write or not and as if they 
chose to write from philanthropy. Alexander has already made amply 
clear what kind of freedom he requires: the freedom in the same 
circumstances (as Ch. 15 says) to do or choose something or not. This 
kind of freedom is needed, he thinks, for choices being up to us and 
hence liable to praise or blame.  
In chapter 19, Alexander extends his invocation of freedom, and 
complains that the Stoics should have conceded that what is up to us is 
free (eleutheron), and under our own control (autexousion), and in 
control (kurion) of the choice (hairesis) and enacting (praxis) of opposite 
alternatives (a requirement still stronger than mere alternatives, and 
                                                        
29 It has been put to me on the other side that when Aristotle allows some animal 
behaviour to be voluntary at 1111a25-6; 1111b8-9 (which I have just argued to 
be sufficient for its being up to them), he must mean this in an attenuated sense, 
because animals do not meet the requirement of knowing (eidenai) what they 
are doing. But eidenai is a very broad term for cognition which can include non-
rational cognition, and my Animal Minds and Human Morals includes (see index 
sv ‘Aristotle, animals and minds’) what Aristotle does try to deny to animals, 
including reason and belief (doxa), and what he concedes. To give only one 
example of concession, the lion perceives that the ox is near and rejoices that he 
will have a meal, Nicomachean Ethics 1118a20-2.  
30 Alexander On Fate, Ch. 18, 188,17-189,8. 
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indeed too strong).31 Nemesius later records the position slightly more 
fully. He has just enunciated Philopator’s formula according to which in 
the same causal circumstances, necessarily the same things happen and it 
is not possible that they happen now this way, now otherwise. Nemesius 
continues: ‘But if being impelled (hormân) too follows of necessity, 
where does the up to us remain? For what is up to us must be free 
(eleutheron). But it would be free [only] if in the same circumstances it 
were up to us now to be impelled (hormân), now not to be impelled.’ 
Here it is still clearer that the freedom required for choices to be up to us 
is that most favoured by Alexander which, contrary to the Stoics, allows 
alternative outcomes in the same causal circumstances.  
 
The Stoic Epictetus on freedom and freedom by nature 
Alexander evidently had not noticed that the Stoic Epictetus had twice 
said something superficially similar to the very thing Alexander asks for 
in chapters 18 and 19. For seven times Epictetus brings in the idea that 
certain things are free by nature (eleutheron phusei).32 The term 
alternates twice in one passage, Discourses 1.9, with ‘free’, but the 
qualification ‘by nature’ can be understood, and ‘free by nature’ does not 
mean the same as ‘free’. Two of the seven passages say that what is up to 
us is free by nature.33 Epictetus had narrowed down the concept of what 
is up to us compared with his predecessors to a small range of 
psychological acts or attitudes that no tyrant could take away from you, 
indeed not even Zeus, as he says at 1.1.23 in his very first discourse, 
which is on what is up to us. Two further passages of Epictetus pick out 
as free by nature our prohairesis, which might very inadequately be 
paraphrased as ‘our will’ and a still further one speaks of what is under 
the control of our will (prohairetikon) as free by nature.34 Since our will 
is our disposition to make choices of a characteristic type, or sometimes 
is our particular choices, Epictetus may seem to be allowing something 
related to the freedom that Alexander desiderates. Of the two passages, 
which treat what is up to us as free by nature, the one from Handbook 
1.2-3 gives extra information.35 ‘What is up to us is free by nature, 
unpreventable, unimpedable, but what is not up to us is weak, slavish, 
preventable, alien. So remember that if you think that what is slavish by 
nature is free and that what is alien is your own, you will be impeded, 
grieved, disturbed, you will blame both gods and humans. But if you 
                                                        
31 Alexander On Fate Ch. 19, 189, 9-11. 
32 Epictetus Discourses 1.19.7; 2.2.3; 2.15.1; 3.22.42; 4.7.8; 4.13.24; Handbook 1.2. 
33 Epicteteus Discourses 2.2.3; Handbook 1.2-3. 
 
34 Epictetus Discourses 1.9.7-8; 2.15.1 and 4.7.8. 
35 Epictetus Handbook 1.2-3. 
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think only what is yours to be yours, and what is alien to be alien, as it is, 
no one will ever compel you; no one will prevent you, you will blame no 
one, you will not do a single thing involuntarily, you will not have an 
enemy, no one will harm you, for neither will you suffer anything 
harmful.’  
Evidently to call something free by nature is not to call it free, but to 
qualify the claim that it is free. Hence to understand it, we need to turn to 
freedom itself (eleutheria). Epictetus devotes a whole discourse to it, 
Discourse 4.1. That freedom is a prized quality rarely achieved by 
anybody. Through careful adjudication of desires, it frees you from inner 
(4.1.86-7) and outer tyrannies, so that you are enslaved to nothing, not to 
house, farm, family, clothes, furniture, nor, he adds (4.4.1-2) books – a 
warning to academics, nor finally to your own body. That is why you can 
tell the external tyrant that he cannot put you in chains, only your leg, 
1.1.23. The rare examples of being free he cites are Socrates and 
Diogenes the Cynic. This Epictetan freedom, unlike Alexander’s 
freedom, does not in any way require indeterminism, which is not even 
mentioned throughout the length of 4.1. It is instead a kind of 
invulnerability, which results from a disposition always to make the right 
choices, such as is also recalled in the passage quoted from Handbook 
1.2-3. Invulnerability is not the free person’s motive for adjudicating 
desires the right way, but the resulting invulnerability is the reason for the 
person’s being described as ‘free’. 
That suggests that what is free by nature is not what is free, but what 
would give you Epictetus’ rare kind of invulnerability, if you would set 
your heart only on the right psychological attitudes that are up to you, in 
the sense that no tyrant could take them away from you.  
Epictetus does say something else about the particular choices of 
everybody, but it falls short of saying that they are free. He says that they 
are not compelled, except by their other choices. He is talking of acts of 
willing (prohaireseis). He says that even if you act under the threat of 
death, nothing compelled that in you which is capable of prohairesis. 
Rather, what happened was that one desire (hormê, orexis) for survival, 
defeated another desire to do the right thing, and specifically, one 
prohairesis, or act of willing, was subjected to necessity by another 
prohairesis, 1.17. 23-26. Epictetus’ response that it is un-compelled 
except by other choices falls a long way short of the freedom (eleutheria) 
that implies invulnerability. It might be expressed by the Stoic term 
autexousion, having things under one’s own control. If that latter term is 
sometimes translated as ‘freedom’,36 it too in Stoicism is freedom that 
falls far short of invulnerability. Epictetus’ claim that action taken under 
                                                        
36 Michael Frede, A Free Will, e.g. p. 75 in the Stoics, cf. p. 96 in Alexander.  
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threat of death is in a way uncompelled shows how distant his interest is 
from that of Aristotle who chose a very different example of such action, 
throwing cargo overboard to save your ship in a storm. As the choice of 
example makes clear, Aristotle’s interest is not in your being in a way 
uncompelled, but in your not being straightforwardly blameworthy. I 
have argued elsewhere that he gave it two different treatments. It is either 
involuntary, or voluntary but typically pardonable.37 
I have now discussed Alexander’s denial of necessity fractionally before 
the moment of action, his concessions to and differences from the Stoic 
account of up to us, his treatment of freedom and that of the Stoic 
Epictetus. I hope that this will be of some interest in itself. But it is also 
necessary for assessing the three objections which have been made to 
Alexander’s counter-intuitive position, in Frede’s celebrated lectures.38 
 
Objection1: should Alexander have recognised that Stoic will is free 
by nature and its choices are under our own control?  
A first objection concerns whether Alexander should not have 
recognised that Epictetus allows that, since the will and its choices are 
free by nature, it is in principle open to everyone that all their choices 
should be free. This was one charge made by Michael Frede, who also 
gave an explanation of Stoic freedom of will in terms of freedom by 
nature in Chapter 5 of his book, A Free Will, although without citing any 
of the seven passages on freedom by nature. Stoic freedom of will, he 
said, was the ability, allowed for by God’s constitution of humans, to 
make our will not only free by nature, but, as in the case of Diogenes and 
Socrates, also free. But the answer to the charge that Alexander should 
have recognised this should now be clear. Epictetus is not telling us that 
everyone’s choices are free (except in the sense of under our control); 
and the sense in which they could in principle be free invokes the rarely 
achieved ideal of a kind of invulnerability, which though extremely 
important, as exemplified occasionally in history – I have cited Mahatma 
                                                        
37 Involuntary Nicomachean Ethics 5.8, 1135b4; Eudemian Ethics 2.8, 1225 a19; 
voluntary, but pardonable, Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1110a18; a 24, as discussed 
in Richard Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame, Duckworth, London 1970, Chicago 
University Press 2006, Bloomsbury, London 2013, pp. 259-263. 
38 The three objections by Michael Frede, A Free Will, Origins of the Notion in 
Ancient Thought, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles 2011, 
are compressed into pp. 97-101. I have discussed other aspects of his book in 
‘Freedom and Will: Graeco-Roman origins’, in Richard Seaford, John Wilkins, 
Matthew Wright, eds, Selfhood and Soul, Essays in Honour of Christopher Gill, 
Cambridge University Press, forthcoming. 
  
14 
Gandhi and Admiral Stockdale as coming close39 – is not on anyone’s 
view the kind of freedom required for one’s being praiseworthy or 
blameworthy. Alexander may be considered right or wrong to suppose 
that the freedom required for that purpose is the freedom to act or not in 
the same circumstances. But he would be right not to count Epictetus’ 
freedom by nature as actually achieved freedom, nor as freedom in the 
sense that he needed for his purposes, and it is only to be expected that he 
would ignore it, even if he had noticed it. 
In fact there is no oversight in Alexander at this point, because he makes 
it explicit what kind of freedom he desiderates. When he says that what is 
up to us is free, he glosses this by saying that what is up to us is in control 
of the choice and doing of opposites in the same circumstances.40 
‘Opposites’ may be an exaggeration, because only doctors know how to 
cure as well as to kill. It would have been enough for Alexander to say 
‘choosing or not, doing or not’. Alexander’s gloss on freedom seems later 
to be explicated by Nemesius, when he says that what is up to us would 
be free only if in the same circumstances it would be up to us now to be 
impelled, now not to be impelled.41 The point that we can choose or do 
different things in the very same circumstances had been made by 
Alexander twice.42 
Frede at one point put his objection not in terms of freedom 
(invulnerability) by nature, but in terms simply of freedom, complaining 
that Alexander failed to see that a Stoic choice might, despite Stoic 
determinism, be free.43 If this is a distinct objection, it will mean freedom 
in a Stoic sense weaker than invulnerability or invulnerability by nature. 
A Stoic choice would be up to us because of our assent, and could also be 
autexousion, under our own control. It would be uncompelled, except by 
another choice. The will from which it came would be by nature free. But 
Alexander’s interest was whether justified praise and blame would be 
excluded by Stoic necessity even before we were born or fractionally 
before the moment of action. He would not have seen this interest as 
being addressed either by Stoic invulnerability, or by any weaker Stoic 
senses of freedom. Of course, Alexander may be wrong, but if I am right 
that there is an unresolved and ongoing disagreement among 
philosophers, at least about the implications of necessity before birth, 
Alexander could not be expected to accept the Stoic senses of freedom as 
                                                        
39 Richard Sorabji, Gandhi and the Stoics, Oxford and Chicago University Presses 
2012, Ch. 3; Stockdale earlier in Emotion and Peace of Mind, Oxford University 
Press, 2000, pp. 225-7. 
40 Alexander On Fate Ch. 19, 189,9-12.  
41 Nemesius On the Nature of Man, 105-6, Morani.  
42 Alexander On Fate Ch. 15, 185, 7 ff; Mantissa 174,3 ff. 
43 Michael Frede, A Free Will, p. 100. 
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relevant to that. I will now spend a moment on a different objection, 
before turning to the big one with which I started. 
 
Objection 2: Ability to do a bad job is not what makes a good job 
praiseworthy 
Frede put a different objection to Alexander by saying that an 
individual’s ability to do a bad job is not what makes his good job 
praiseworthy, nor that from which his good job derives its merit.44 To this 
I would reply that Alexander’s point was that the possibility of his having 
done otherwise was only a necessary prerequisite of someone doing a 
praiseworthy job, not that it made his job praiseworthy. I think there is 
something to be said for this more modest claim. If from birth someone 
had been unable to do anything less than a good job, I think our attitude 
might be one of awe, but it would not be one of praise, just as Aristotle 
says that the gods, and even the most godlike of men, are above praise.45 
 
Objection 3: Does Alexander’s opposition to the necessity of the 
same action in the same circumstances divorce agents from their 
motives, desires and beliefs? On Fate Ch. 15 and Mantissa § 23 
We encountered objection 3 earlier, when we noticed Frede ascribing to 
Alexander the idea that decisions and choices are independent of the 
desires and beliefs of the person. He ascribed such a view in modern 
times also to Dihle, but the ascription to Alexander, with the same 
wording, had been made by Bobzien. In fact, the strategy I ascribed to 
Alexander in the two passages I quoted was very much the opposite. 
Alexander was there precisely linking choices and decisions to the 
agent’s alternative standing motives as cause. The three motives 
mentioned very much involved desires and beliefs. Alexander’s denial of 
necessity even at the moment of decision or choice did not depend on 
divorcing decision or choice from motive with its desires and beliefs. It 
depended instead on there being no necessity which of several standing 
motives would operate. I therefore think that the third objection fails. 
 
A final objection 
Nonetheless, a different objection may be raised against Alexander’s 
reply to Philopator, who charged that Stoicism would make decisions and 
choices causeless. Alexander’s reply, we saw, was that we have more 
than one standing motive and these are perfectly good causes, even 
though there need be no necessity which one will operate in the same 
circumstances. Alexander ought to concede that there may be no 
                                                        
44 Michael Frede, loc. cit. 
45 Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1.12, 1101b18-34. 
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explanation of which cause operates, but that was not the objection 
raised. Philopator’s objection was interested in actions or choices being 
causeless and that has not been proved.  
The new objection needs to concede that Philopator’s objection has not 
been proved. But it may still protest that Alexander’s position is 
unbelievable. Against that quite different objection, I shall have, in 
closing, to recall the argument I used in the book I mentioned above 
which presented Aristotle too as divorcing cause from necessity.46  For 
Aristotle what we call a cause is one of four types of explanatory factor, 
as he spells out in Physics 2.3, and Alexander would agree. I have argued 
in my earlier discussion, though that claim is not needed now, that this 
account of cause avoids the defects of many other definitions, including 
those in terms of necessitation.47 The point of interest now is that whether 
one has an explanation and even a complete explanation is relative to the 
question asked. I did not put this forward as a view of explanation 
formulated by Aristotle. He indeed thinks that, at least within the sphere 
of physical science, some things are better fitted by nature to explain. But 
this is compatible with their being so fitted in relation to a question, and I 
at any rate think that an explanation or complete explanation has to 
answer a question. That question often asks for one fact to be explained 
in face of what appears to be another conflicting fact.48 To adapt one of 
my earlier examples, a good student might have two incentives, (a) the 
desire to attend a good lecture course, and (b) the struggle if he has to live 
exceptionally far off campus. Suppose he attends 9 out of 10 lectures. 
Someone might want to know why he missed one lecture, in face of the 
contrasting fact that he was motivated and the lectures were interesting, 
or in face of the contrasting fact that even unmotivated students were 
present. There is a perfectly good explanation: the exceptional distance to 
campus was always a disincentive, and that was his reason for missing 
one lecture, to his own regret. The lack of necessity has not detached him, 
as alleged, from his past motivations. Of course, a determinist will hold 
that there must have been some extra causal factor on the one occasion 
when he did not attend the lecture (his children were less well; he was 
more tired), just as an indeterminist will say that there need not have 
been. But these are merely expressions of faith, which tell us little more 
than ‘I am a determinist’, or ‘I am an indeterminist’. It is not possible to 
argue the case by saying that without an extra factor there will be no 
                                                        
46 Necessity, Cause and Blame, Ch. 2 
47 Necessity, Cause and Blame, Ch. 3. 
48 I took this point (ibid. pp. 29-30) from Michael Scriven, ‘Explanations, 
predictions and laws’, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science vol. 3, ed. H 
Feigl and G. Maxwell, Minneapolis 1962; and review in Review of Metaphysics 17, 
1963-4, pp. 403-24, of E. Nagel’s The Structure of Science. 
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explanation of the non-attendance. The exceptional distance is a perfectly 
good explanation in relation to the question asked. Moreover, there will 
be a perfectly good explanation in relation to innumerable other contrasts 
that might be raised.  
There is admittedly one fact that cannot be explained, on this view, 
namely the student’s missing one lecture in face of a different fact: that he 
attended nine. But why should there be an explanation in relation to every 
contrast we care to choose? Aristotle, as I believe, drew attention to 
another case in which there is no explanation: coincidences are 
unexplained conjunctions of things, each of which is itself perfectly 
explicable.49 Be that as it may, in the present case, the missing lecture is 
inexplicable only in relation to a question of one particular type. It might 
be thought that distance does not provide a complete explanation, but 
completeness is also relative to the question asked, and the explanation is 
complete in relation to the question specified and innumerable others. 
Certainly, it would be irrelevant to seek to add the entire history of the 
universe, if that expression had any meaning, in the hope of adding 
completeness. 
Suppose the lecturer, fully apprised of the student’s situation, still 
insisted on an explanation of the one non-attendance in face of the 
attendances on other occasions. It would be hard to believe that the 
lecturer really did not understand. Rather, he or she might seem to be 
demanding an apology rather than an explanation,50and using the 
attendances to show that the one absence was not necessary. It would 
have been more human to offer to help to the student to catch up.  
The argument is that what is explained or caused is not thereby required 
to be necessitated. The distance was a standing motive on every occasion, 
but on Alexander’s type of view, it may have taken effect only on one, 
and this need not have been because of an extra factor, nor by any 
necessity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
49 So I interpreted Aristotle Metaphysics 6.3, in Necessity, Cause and Blame, Ch. 1.  
50 I thank Raphael Woolf for making this observation. 
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